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Abstract 
In this article, I relate the demand that Paul Ricœur suggests mimesis places on the way we think about truth 
to the idea that the work of art is a model for thinking about testimony. By attributing a work’s epoché of 
reality to the work of imagination, I resolve the impasse that arises from attributing music, literature, and 
art’s distance from the real to their social emancipation. Examining the conjunction, in aesthetic experience, 
of the communicability and the exemplarity of a work reveals how Ricœur’s definition of mimesis as 
refiguration relates to the “rule” that the work summons. This “rule” constitutes the solution to a problem 
or question for which the work is the answer. In conclusion, as a model for thinking about testimony, the 
claims that works make have a counterpart in the injunctions that issue from exemplary moral and political 
acts. 
Keywords: Aesthetic experience, Mimesis, Judgment, Testimony 
Résumé 
Dans cet article, j’établis un lien entre l’exigence que, selon Paul Ricœur,la mimèsis place dans notre façon 
de penser la vérité, et l’idée que l’œuvre d’art est un modèle pour penser le témoignage. Appliquant 
l’époché de la réalité  à l’oeuvre d’imagination,  j’évite l’impasse qui se dresse lorsqu’on attribue la musique, 
la littérature et la distance artistique du réel à leur émancipation sociale. L’étude de la conjonction du 
caractère communicable et exemplaire d’une œuvre – dans l’expérience esthétique - met en lumière la 
relation que la définition par Ricœur de la mimésis comme refiguration établit avec la “règle” que l’œuvre 
convoque. Cette règle est la solution au problème auquel l’oeuvre apporte une réponse. Finalement, un  
modèle pour penser le témoignage peut être trouvé dans des oeuvres qui trouvent leur contrepartie dans les 
injonctions  produites par les actions morales et politiques exemplaires. 
Mots-clés : Expérience esthétique, Mimesis, Jugement, Témoignage 
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Music, literature, and art’s power to open our horizons places a new demand on the way 
that we think about truth. Critics and cultural theorists have long maintained that musical works, 
literary texts, works of art, dance performances, and the like are more than just ideologically 
complicit in maintaining the status quo. By insisting that works can contest and subvert the 
existing order of reality, literary critics, cultural musicologists, and critical theorists have 
presumed that these cultural phenomena can also break open congealed systems of thought and 
fields of experience. Music, literature, and art more than just reflect or reproduce already 
constructed representations of reality. By inventing new ways of thinking, seeing, feeling, and 
acting, individual works renew the practical field in accordance with the different worlds that 
each expresses through placing reality into suspense.  
The difficulty—and even the impossibility—of deriving a cultural work’s creative or 
productive potential from the aesthetic’s relegation to a separate social sphere is indicative of the 
challenge posed by the presumption of music and art’s critical bite. Despite efforts to rehabilitate 
the aesthetic, retrieving music and art’s subversive, productive potential from the aesthetic’s 
ideologically deleterious function has proven to be a daunting task. The paradox—that the 
aesthetic’s isolation should also be the condition of art and music’s critical vehemence—is more 
than just ironic; it also dooms the attempt to derive music’s critical vehemence from the fact of its 
social emancipation. It is difficult to see how, as weapons in the fight for social position and 
power, literature and art could also be the wellspring of the world’s practical transformation. 
And yet, apart from the world’s redescription in the light of the alternatives that works proffer, 
music, literature, and art’s presumed efficacy is merely a conceptual chimera.  
Music poses some special challenges in this respect. Absolute music—instrumental music 
that has no programmatic associations—is devoid of any obvious referents. Historically, musical 
hermeneutics has provided a way of redressing this apparent deficiency with respect to music’s 
representation of its content. This recourse to a method for ascribing meaning to a work, 
however, conceals the more fundamental question: How does a musical work communicate a 
meaning that is specific to it? The power to communicate an experience that only this work 
occasions is decisive. The work’s communicability thus provides an initial touchstone for 
inquiring into the relation between aesthetic experience and the demand that the capacity for 
discovering new allusions to reality places on the way we think about truth. 
This capacity for inventing new ways of experiencing the world lies at the heart of the 
question of the work’s truth. The challenge that this question poses becomes even more 
pronounced when we consider the individual character of the experience communicated by a 
work. Whether it is a piece of music, a literary text, a painting, a sculpture, a theatrical 
production, or a dance performance, every encounter is singularly unique. Every encounter 
involves an individual listener, reader, or spectator, a particular work, and distinctive 
circumstances. One of the major difficulties for criticism springs from this irreplaceable relation 
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between the work and the listener, reader, or spectator; this relation is also the condition for 
every meaningful engagement with the world that the work expresses. Moreover, the experience 
occasioned by a work is in principle open to all. The question of the work’s truth thus gives rise 
to a formidable paradox. My wager is that, through following this paradox to its end, the 
prospective dimension of the claim that a work makes through aesthetically prefiguring new 
ways of thinking, feeling, and acting will overtake the classical conception of truth. 
The distance that aesthetic experience introduces into the heart of reality is crucial in this 
respect. The defamiliarization and displacement of the everyday world is in this sense the 
condition for reality’s imaginative redescription and refiguration. This distance, which originates 
with the work’s suspension of the practical order, is bound up with the work’s figurative power. 
Theodor W. Adorno’s attempt to attribute this distance to art and music’s social emancipation 
has the advantage of highlighting what for him was art’s first social characteristic. And yet, as I 
will argue, the force of the claim that a work makes is more immediately bound up with its 
exemplary character. Through joining Paul Ricœur’s suggestion that mimesis is ahead of our 
ordinary concept of truth to his question as to whether the work of art might serve as a model for 
thinking about testimony, I intend to draw out the connection between a work’s exemplarity and 
music’s communicability of feelings and moods that redescribe our inherence in the world. In the 
process, I hope also to show how judgment and imagination figure in the work’s expression of a 
meaning whose prospective dimension augments the practical field of our everyday experiences. 
Critical Distance 
The status of the distance that separates a musical work, a literary text, or a work of art 
from the practical field provides an initial indication of the nature of a work’s claim to truth. 
During the nineteenth century, for example, music—and especially absolute music—was 
regarded as an intimation of the infinite. Once vested with metaphysical dignity, purely 
instrumental music was considered to be a “language beyond language.” This conceit of 
ineffability, however, eventually came under attack. Postmodern musicologists deconstructed the 
nineteenth-century hubris of music’s metaphysical transcendence and replaced it with 
contextualized readings of gendered identities, sexual politics, and hegemonic political agendas. 
In a dramatic reversal, the distance accorded music was wrested from its chimerical autonomy 
and was denounced as the ideological construct of a bourgeois aesthetic culture. 
Adorno, however, was not so quick to dismiss the significance of music and art’s claim to 
autonomy. For him, the distance instituted through music and art’s attainment of their own 
autonomous standpoints was essential to their critical social function. In his debate with Walter 
Benjamin over politically committed art, Adorno insisted on privileging art’s aesthetic autonomy 
over its service to a political agenda. Committed art, Adorno maintained, “is not intended to 
generate ameliorative measures, legislative acts or practical institutions.”1 Rather its proper 
function consists in resisting the course of the world. Art or music accomplishes this through its 
internal construction, that is, “by its form alone.”2 The committed work of art thus satisfies its 
ideal only by renouncing tendentious political allegiances. For Adorno, this ideal was evinced by 
the polemical alienation that Brecht invented as a theorist, and which “as an artist [he] practised 
less and less as he committed himself more firmly to the role of a friend of mankind.”3 However 
politically radical the message might be, its advocacy through a work of art turns the work into a 
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weapon in the political arsenal of the party, the nation, or the idea in whose service it is placed at 
the expense of its true critical raison d’être. 
Adorno’s conviction that art’s aesthetic autonomy is the requisite condition of its critical 
social truth highlights the aporia in question. On the one hand, art for art’s sake—the hallmark of 
art’s claim to autonomy—“denies by its absolute claims that ineradicable connection with reality 
which is the polemical a priori of the very attempt to make art autonomous from the real.”4 On 
the other hand, committed art, which is “necessarily detached as art from reality, cancels the 
distance between the two.”5 Only through constituting itself “in relation to what it is not,”6 
Adorno tells us, can art resist its assimilation to the existing order of things. Hence the negative 
dialectical turn: as a social fact, art is at the same time non-identical with the social totality by 
reason of the distancing relation won through its aesthetic autonomy.  
Adorno’s aesthetic theory trades on this aporia. He, along with other Frankfurt School 
critical theorists, was justifiably suspicious of the deleterious role that music, literature, and 
theatre played in modern social life. Adorno went so far as to denounce any positive relation 
between works of art and empirical reality as a betrayal of art’s critical social intent. For him, art’s 
distance from reality was its first social characteristic.7 As the “social antithesis of society,”8 
works of art consequently acquired their real value and force only in their determinate 
opposition to ideologically routinized practices. 
We might wonder, however, whether through pointing “to a practice from which they 
abstain: the creation of a just life,”9 works of music, literature, and art break free of the epistemic 
order to which they are determinately opposed. For Adorno, Arnold Schoenberg’s music, for 
example, modeled the only philosophy that could be practiced responsibly in the face of despair. 
Through contemplating “all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of 
redemption”10 so to speak, Schoenberg’s music revealed contradictions and antagonisms 
otherwise concealed by instrumental reason’s encroachment on all spheres of life. And yet for 
this music as for art, “utopia—the yet-to-exist—is draped in black.”11 Hence their melancholic 
condition: set against the existing order to which they are opposed, works become a refuge for a 
truth that loses itself in its unremitting suspicion. 
This hibernatory refuge, which holds out scarcely any hope for the world’s reclamation, 
is also the vanishing point of music and art’s claim to truth. From this standpoint, the “question 
of the reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly matters.”12 Remonstrating against 
ideologically calcified systems of domination holds open the possibility of a utopian alternative. 
At the same time, the promised condition of freedom—which Adorno, like Max Horkheimer, 
extracted from the program of the Enlightenment—constantly removes itself to an infinite 
distance.  
This paradox—that art’s constitution in opposition to real social conditions is perhaps the 
sole remaining refuge for truth—dominates Adorno’s aesthetic theory. The impossibility of 
deriving the aesthetic’s creative potential from the fact of art’s social emancipation fuels the 
performative contradiction that, according to Jürgen Habermas, inheres in a totalizing critique. 
This contradiction—which dominates a critique for which the “suspicion of ideology becomes 
total”13—insinuates itself in art’s melancholic condition. Confined to the imaginary reparation of 
the catastrophes that pile up in the wake of the Enlightenment’s dialectical reversal, the 
projection in art of a semblance of freedom therefore comes “at the price of [any] real 
reconciliation.”14 The spell cast by reason’s transformation into the instrument of the subject’s 
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domination consigns music and art to this melancholic condition. With what force, we might 
therefore wonder, could a work of art, a literary work, or a musical composition recall a condition 
of freedom that, under this spell, has not yet and might not ever come to pass? 
The seeming advantage of attributing art’s first social characteristic to its distance from 
empirical reality thus also proves to be a major stumbling block. Attributing music and art’s 
critical truth content to the fact of their social emancipation identifies music and art’s aesthetic 
autonomy as a node of resistance. At the same time, the enigmatic promise—that art’s truth, 
which cannot be deduced from the existing order of reality, holds out the hope of the world’s 
transformation—is also the vanishing point of the work’s critical force. So long as art’s truth 
remains bound to the historical moment when music and art attained their own autonomous 
standpoint, the illusion—the semblance—in music and art of an order beyond the world’s 
instrumental functioning remains dependent upon this socially instituted aesthetic sphere. For 
Adorno, authentic works militate against the false consciousness of congealed social 
contradictions, the untruth of which they expose. Through recalling the anticipated condition of 
utopian freedom without betraying it to existence, art’s refractory objectification of the truth of 
real social conditions operates within the domain of a critical project haunted by its own 
relentless negativity. 
Art and music’s promise of an end to antagonisms consequently lays bare the 
contradiction that stems from deriving art’s critical impulse from its attainment of its own 
autonomous standpoint. On the one hand, music and art’s aesthetic autonomy instantiates the 
distance that, for Adorno, was the requisite condition of their critical social function and truth. 
On the other hand, this distance is also the condition for dissembling music and art’s ideological 
complicity. Hence the dilemma: how can the aesthetic’s institution as a separate sphere also serve 
as the condition for art and music’s critical force?  
The difficulty, and even the impossibility, of wresting a productive value from the 
aesthetic’s ideological constitution brings this dilemma to the fore. Rather than simply denounce 
the aesthetic, George Levine and Terry Eagleton, for example, have argued for its rehabilitation.15 
The enigma, however, cannot be resolved at the level at which it is posed. By placing art’s 
distance from reality at the center of his theory of music and art’s critical social function, Adorno 
underscores the connection between art and music’s efficacy and their distancing relation to the 
real. And yet, attributing this distance to the fact of art’s social emancipation leads inexorably to 
the performative contradiction exemplified by the refuge that truth takes in music and art’s 
retreat into their own aesthetically autonomous spheres. 
The impasse engendered by this strategy is inescapable. Squaring art’s social institution 
as an autonomous entity—which renders it ideological—with the idea that its autonomy also 
institutes the distancing relation necessary to its emancipatory potential proves to be something 
of a Sisyphean task.16 By insisting that truth is something that is not made, Adorno intends to set 
music and art’s critical impulse against the heteronomous law that subordinates all aspects of life 
to instrumental reason’s calculative purposes. By recalling “precisely what does not exist for-an-
other,”17 the work remonstrates against this law through the artifice of its own internal rule. And 
yet from this vantage-point, so long as “what is true in art is something nonexistent,”18 the truth 
to which the work lays claim remains bound to the schema of music, literature, and art’s aesthetic 
autonomy. So long as their utopian thrust consists “essentially in the determined negation . . . of 
that which merely is,”19 music, literature, and art’s determined opposition to the existing 
empirical order draws its force from the arts’ social emancipation. But then their critical force is 
Aesthetic Experience, Mimesis and Testimony 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 3, No 1 (2012)    ISSN 2155-1162 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2012.114   http://ricoeur.pitt.edu  
176 
 
still a function of the distance instituted by their aesthetic autonomy, to which their truth also 
continues to be held hostage. 
Aesthetic Experience 
The presumption of a work’s capacity to stand over against the practical field of 
everyday experiences is indispensable to the idea that music, literature, theatre, dance, and art 
can not only resist the course of things, but that they can also propose imaginative alternatives 
that in turn can affect the ways in which we inhabit the world. George Levine’s plea for a view of 
the aesthetic that would acknowledge its liberatory potential stresses the need to rehabilitate the 
practice of only denouncing works for their deleterious meanings and functions.20 At the same 
time, attributing music, literature, and art’s critical force to the aesthetic’s institution as a separate 
social sphere confounds the effort of extracting a creative, productive impetus from this 
otherwise ideologically duplicitous condition. 
Broaching the question of literature, art or music’s truth in this way has the advantage of 
drawing out the nature of the connection between a work’s distancing relation to the real and its 
productive character. By setting the work’s social truth against the existing empirical order, 
Adorno succeeded in highlighting the work’s distance from social reality as the condition of its 
critical force. By the same token, taking the work’s aesthetic autonomy as the origin of this 
distance leads inexorably to that hibernatory refuge that is concomitant with music and art’s 
melancholic condition. Adorno’s aesthetic theory evinces the dependence of music and art’s 
claim to truth on this distancing relation. Nothing, however, commits us to the idea that this 
distance (which is arguably the condition for music and art’s critical force) originates with the 
work’s aesthetic autonomy in the social environs of the cult of the bourgeois religion of art. 
That art and music’s truth depends upon their relation to the existing order from 
which—in a sense that remains to be developed—they take their distance bears on the nature of 
the claim that art or music could be said to make. Everything rests on the way that this relation is 
understood. When, for example, the opposition between an aesthetically autonomous work and 
material reality is reversed, the truth of the work is made to consist of its embodiment of socially 
constructed representations of gendered identities, sexual politics, and exoticizing displays. 
Adorno’s critical practice surpasses deconstructive strategies in this respect. For him, music and 
art’s difference from the empirical order gives rise to refractory objectifications that, through 
remonstrating against the existing order, reveal the lack, in reality, of an end to antagonisms. 
We might wonder whether a mode of truth that invariably assumes this negative 
dialectical cast ever exceeds the work’s determinate negation of reality. At the same time, a 
fascination with deconstructing music’s claim to aesthetic autonomy blinds some to their reliance 
upon a concept of representation whose illusory character they vehemently denounce. One of the 
main attractions of narrativizing interpretations is that they provide a means for ascribing a 
meaningful content to an otherwise seemingly ineffable musical experience. Janet Wolff 
underscores the critical interest that cultural theorists and critical musicologists have in 
interpretative strategies that provide a method for deciphering ostensibly socially constructed 
representations of gender and sexuality. Since “a cultural form with narrative content can be 
more easily related to political ideas than one . . . like music,”21 identifying music’s structural 
features with a narrative program provides a method for deciphering hidden political referents. 
Discovering such referents within music’s internal relations has the appearance of overcoming 
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music’s apparent lack of extra-musical meaning. Ironically, here the classical concept of truth as 
adequation also dominates the tactical position taken. Anthropomorphizing interpretations of the 
actions and motives of (quasi-) characters who populate these “musical” stories, and 
narrativizing explanations of hegemonic political agendas thus replace defenses of music’s 
purely aesthetic value.22 
The paradox that springs from reversing the terms of the opposition that sets music’s 
claim to autonomy against social and political agendas brings to the fore the inner connection 
between differing views of music’s relation to the real and conceptions of its truth. For Ricœur, 
the distance that a work introduces into the heart of reality is attributable to the productive 
imagination. Correlatively, his theory of mimesis has the advantage of exploding the classical 
concept of truth. In contrast to this concept of truth—where the adequation of concept and thing 
defines the truth of the representation—Ricœur’s theory ties the claim that a work makes to its 
ontological vehemence. Imagination, which is productive only when “thought is at work,”23 is 
operative in the distance that a work takes from the real. This distance—which each work 
achieves through placing the real into suspense—is at the same time the condition for the work’s 
redescription of ways of inhering in the world. Consequently, the epoché that the work 
introduces into the heart of reality is also the condition of the work’s critical bite. 
Music is especially instructive in this respect. Music, it has often been said, is a non-
representational art. Its expressive power thus appears to lie outside the bounds of all verbal or 
conceptual representation. At the same time, the experiences that tunes, songs, and musical 
works afford are decidedly meaningful; they bring to the fore the fact that music’s power of 
expression is rooted in the communicability of affective qualities that individual works possess.24 
The risk of succumbing to the allure of music’s ineffability is therefore not as great as it at first 
might seem. Postmodern musicologists have been indefatigable in their criticism of the 
metaphysical conceit of music’s transcendence of the world. And yet, tearing away the mask of a 
“language beyond language” through reverting to socially constructed representations only 
avoids the challenge of accounting for the communicability of an experience that resists its 
conceptual recuperation. The communicability of an experience that is singularly unique 
provides a privileged point of access to the challenge posed by my assertion that the way we 
think about music, literature, or art’s truth depends upon how we understand its relation to the 
real. The question of music’s distance from the real, which I took up above, provides a critical 
touchstone in this respect. 
As I just mentioned, Ricœur’s theory of mimesis provides a crucial advantage in 
attributing this distancing relation to the work’s power to project a world that refigures the 
practical field of everyday experiences through placing it in suspense. Here the work’s retreat 
from the real is only the negative condition for reality’s redescription in the light of a heuristic 
fiction. As an operative mode of the productive imagination, imitation, Ricœur points out, “is no 
longer a reduplication of reality but a creative rendering of it.”25 Imagination is therefore at work 
in a work through producing itself as a world.  
That the work of imagination manifests itself in the world projected by the work sets 
thought about truth on a new path. (I will follow this path below, when I take up Ricœur’s 
suggestion that mimesis is ahead even of Heidegger’s concept of truth as manifestation.) At the 
same time, the power of imagination operative in this mimetic activity presupposes the work’s 
communicability. Hence, before proceeding to a consideration of what this power demands of the 
way we think about truth, I want first to draw out how the claim that a work makes upon us vis-
Aesthetic Experience, Mimesis and Testimony 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 3, No 1 (2012)    ISSN 2155-1162 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2012.114   http://ricoeur.pitt.edu  
178 
 
à-vis the world depends upon the communicability of an experience that fully merits being called 
aesthetic. 
Some of the most stubborn difficulties for any reflection on music, literature, or art’s 
meaning spring from the fact that this experience “involves each time a reader, a spectator, or a 
listener.”26 The singularity of the experience occasioned by a work thus immediately appears to 
militate against any general rule. The meaning of the experience resists its subsumption under a 
prescriptive, universal norm. In view of the unique nexus of an individual work, listener, and 
circumstance, it is tempting to suggest that aesthetic experiences are merely subjective. But how 
then could music—traditional, popular, or modern—for example, serve as a symbol of a group or 
a national identity? That the experiences afforded by music contribute in some way to the 
formation of a common bond overturn the solipsistic consequences of the radical subjectivization 
of aesthetic experience. Hence the central paradox: how is an experience that is unique to each 
listener communicable in such a way that it can, in principle, be shared among all? 
This paradox underscores the role of judgment in aesthetic experience. The Irish tale The 
Gifts of the Little People is illuminating in this regard. In this tale, two hunchbacks encounter the 
fairy folk. The first overhears the fairies singing and dancing while walking past a fairy fort one 
night. After listening to the fairies’ song, which was the nicest he had ever heard, he took up the 
fairies’ refrain Dé Luain, Dé Máirt, Dé Luain, Dé Máirt, Dé Luain, Dé Máirt, [Monday, Tuesday, 
Monday, Tuesday, Monday, Tuesday], and added the words Is Dé Céadaoin! [And Wednesday!] 
to enhance the tune.27  Delighted by this addition, the fairies reward the first hunchback by 
removing his hump. Upon discovering the secret of the first hunchback’s good fortune, the 
second hunchback tried his luck. A year later on the next Samhaim Eve, he set off for the fort 
without delay. The second hunchback, “who was in a great hurry to get rid of his hump, never 
thought of waiting until the fairies had done, or watching for a fit opportunity to raise the tune 
higher.”28 Believing that if adding one day was good, adding two would be even better, the 
second hunchback takes up the refrain Dé Luain, Dé Máirt, Dé Luain, Dé Máirt, Dé Luain, Dé Máirt, 
Dé Céadaoin and adds Agus Diaradoin! [and Thursday!]. Outraged by this affront, the offended 
fairies rewarded the second hunchback by adding the first hunchback’s hump to the one he 
already had. 
How in this tale, we could ask, did the fairies discriminate between the two hunchbacks’ 
additions to their song? In the absence of any rule that would determine the merits of the added 
refrains, the fairies could only determine the suitability of these added refrains in their singular 
instances. The judgment that the first hunchback’s words Is Dé Céadaoin raised the tune higher 
rests on a grasp of the fit of the tune. The first hunchback’s genius has its complement in the 
fairies’ exercise of a power and a capacity that Kant attributes to judgments of taste. For, through 
apprehending the suitability of the first hunchback’s refrain, the fairies’ grasp of the song’s 
heightened expressive character attests to the communicability of the new fit of the song.  
This capacity for grasping the fit of a tune, song, or work is the hallmark of aesthetic 
judgment. Ricœur explains that, by differentiating between aesthetic judgment and determinative 
judgment, Kant allowed for a “split within the idea of subsumption.”29 In aesthetic judgment, the 
act by which a case is placed under a rule is reversed. For a “given case, one ‘seeks’ the 
appropriate rule under which to place the singular experience.”30 This judgment, Ricœur 
explains,  is “‘merely’ reflective because the transcendental subject does not determine any 
universally valid objectivity, but instead only takes into account the procedure the mind follows 
in the operation of subsumption, proceeding in a way from below to above.”31 In judgments of 
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taste, the singular case summons its “rule” by schematizing it. Summoning the “rule” is therefore 
indistinguishable from creating it. Accordingly, a tune’s communicability rests on the air of 
rightness emanating from it. In the tale The Gifts of the Little People, this air of rightness stems from 
the singular fit produced by the first hunchback’s refrain, which stands apart from the second’s 
disfigurement of the fairies’ song. This disfigurement, which is visited literally on the unfortunate 
hunchback in the punishment he receives, conversely evinces the abortive attempt to wrench 
such a fit through calculative means. 
The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of one of the archaic usages of the word “fit” 
as a “piece of music; a strain” is instructive in this regard. According to the OED, in this context a 
strain is a “musical sequence of sounds; a melody, a tune.” The connection between the ordered 
sequence of sounds and the fit—the character—of a song becomes more explicit if we allow 
ourselves to be instructed by the ancient art of rhetoric. For this art, dispositio was specifically 
directed toward the arrangement of the parts. The rhetorician’s intention to move her listeners 
depends upon the affective power that springs from the composition of her speech.32 Inclining 
listeners toward the rhetorician’s viewpoint is not different from disposing them to think, feel, 
and act in accordance with this point of view.  
Music’s and poetry’s expression of the feelings or moods that they possess also springs 
from the internal ordering of their constitutive elements. The elevation of feeling to fiction, which 
Ricœur emphasizes is the condition of feelings’ mimetic deployment, coincides with this retreat 
to the interior ordering of a musical or poetic world. Poetic language, Ricœur stresses, is “not 
directed outwards, but inwards to an interior, which is nothing other than the mood structured 
and expressed by a poem.”33 Here, he says, “a poem is like a musical work in that its mood is 
exactly coextensive with the internal order of symbols articulated by its language.”34 This eclipse 
of the real by the world structured by a poem or a musical work acquires its true force in the 
return to the practical field. Through giving voice to moods and feelings that individual works 
alone possess, poetry and music open us to the world anew.   
Each work has its “rule.” Through displaying the feelings and moods that only it 
possesses, each tune, song, or musical work expresses its own “thought” or “idea” (dianoia). This 
“idea” constitutes the “rule” to which the work’s configuration as a whole gives voice. Through 
accompanying and completing the work of imagination, feelings articulated by the work’s 
distinctive internal make-up make the “thought” (dianoia) expressed by an individual work our 
own. Feeling, Ricœur argues, fulfills its general function through interiorizing the reality that we 
objectify over against ourselves through uniting an “intention toward the world and an affection 
of the self.” Accordingly, feeling does “not posit any ‘being’.”35 Rather, feelings reveal the way in 
which we are affected through “manifesting a relation to the world that constantly restores our 
complicity with it.”36 “To feel,” Ricœur explains, “is to make ours what has been put at a distance 
by thought in its objectifying phase.”37 Consequently, this self-assimilation through feeling is a 
part of the commitment proper to the work’s illocutionary force.  
The worlding power of individual works not only opens the distance separating the 
mimetic displacement of poetic feelings from the affective field of everyday experiences; the 
work’s affective tonalities are also the singular instantiation of feelings and moods emanating 
from the world expressed by a work. The “rule” summoned by the work is the response that a 
work provides to the crisis, question, or problem for which it constitutes the answer. There is in 
the end no creatio ex nihilo. Rather, the enigma of artistic creation lies in the fact that what, in the 
artist’s experience, is incommunicable,“can be transposed in the form of a singular problem to be 
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resolved.”38 For Ricœur, genius resides in this “capacity to respond in a singular manner to the 
singular nature of the question.”39 By taking the form of a poetic solution, the work makes 
something of this experience communicable:  
Something of her [the artist’s] experience, precisely because it has been carried by a work, 
is going to be able to be communicated.  Her naked experience as such was 
incommunicable; but, as soon as it can be problematized in the form of a singular question 
which is adequately answered in the form of a response that is singular as well, then it 
acquires communicability. The work iconically augments the lived experience, 
inexpressible, incommunicable, closed upon itself.  It is this iconic augmentation, as 
augmentation, that is communicable.40 
Far from reproducing the artist’s, the composer’s, or the author’s interior life, the experience 
communicated by a work breaks open affective and cognitive dimensions of the field of praxis. 
The adequation between the “singularity of the solution . . . and the singularity of the crisis 
situation”41 rests on the judgment that discerns the fit between them. Following G. Granger, 
Ricœur argues that this adequation merits the term style. The adequacy of the work vis-à-vis the 
question or problem for which it alone is the answer overruns the classical conception of truth. 
For where it is a matter of the fittingness of the work, the truth of the work lies with its power to 
refigure the practical field of our experiences. The “rule” that the work summons is 
communicable by means of the grasp of this fittingness.  The work, we could therefore say, 
communicates this “rule” by exemplifying it. 
Exemplarity 
That a work expresses a meaning only it possesses highlights the singular relation that 
gives rise to the paradox of aesthetic experience. This paradox, I suggested earlier, springs from 
the unique relation between each listener, reader, or spectator and an individual work that at the 
same time is in principle open to everyone. Consequently, the universality of the claim that a 
work makes rests on the singular nature of the experience through which the work 
communicates its meaning. By grasping the fit of the work, each listener, reader, or spectator 
apprehends the “rule” that the work summons. And yet we could ask: How does this “rule” have 
any validity with respect to its claim to universality when the judgment through which it 
exercises its force is merely reflective? 
Entering the paradox in this way overtakes the impasse that we encountered in Adorno’s 
effort to rescue art’s truth. This impasse, to recall, stems from Adorno’s attempt to preserve art 
and music’s critical social function in the face of instrumental reason’s increasing encroachment 
on all spheres of life. Art’s melancholic condition, I suggested, is consequently also the vanishing 
point of music and art’s transformative power: for, short of a real end to antagonisms, music and 
art are only a refuge for a critical mode of social truth that holds out scarcely any hope of the 
world’s reclamation. 
In my view, the real power that works have with respect to the practical field is 
concentrated in the work’s exemplification of the “thought” (dianoia), feelings, and moods that it 
possesses. I argued previously that works augment the practical field through summoning the 
“rule” that each work expresses. Moreover, each work expresses this “rule” only by exemplifying 
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it. Ricœur’s analysis of Nelson Goodman’s treatment of exemplification is illuminating in this 
regard. By treating exemplification as the obverse of denotation, Goodman reverses the direction 
of denotation so that the referent becomes a property that an object possesses. (For example, the 
label “green” might denote the color of a swatch. However, the swatch exemplifies the label by 
expressing “greenness.”) This reversal of direction makes exemplification a mode of expression. 
The symmetry of exemplification and denotation by inversion not only surmounts the “ruinous 
distinction of the cognitive and emotive . . . from which that of denotation and connotation is 
derived”42; this change in direction also accentuates the retreat from the real that is the condition 
of a work’s power to refigure the practical field of our experiences. The distance that the work 
takes from this field is therefore a function of the exemplification of the world that the work alone 
expresses. 
As the inverse of denotation, the exemplification of the meaning, properties, or 
characteristics that a work possesses brings about a change in the work’s referential status. 
Ricœur draws this conclusion: both “exemplifying and denoting are cases of making reference, 
with only a difference of direction.”43 Ricœur moreover argues that this symmetry by inversion 
does not account for the way that a work’s representation of a fictive alternative helps to 
refashion the world. Expressing properties by exemplifying them alters the direction of the 
referential operation, so that these properties themselves become the intended referent. At the 
same time, the metaphorical transfer of the properties that a work possesses—as when, in the 
example Ricœur gives, a grey picture is said to express sadness—suspends the flow of ordinary 
references. Expressing a thought, idea, mood, or feeling by exemplifying it cannot therefore be 
restricted to the existing field of representations. On the contrary, the “epoché of descriptive 
reference”44 proper to the strategy of poetic discourse, which accompanies this change in 
direction, highlights the retreat from the real that, as I just stressed, is also the condition for 
reality’s redescription in the light of a heuristic fiction. 
Tying exemplification to the redescription of reality in this way highlights the connection 
between the “rule” that the work summons and the power of thought and imagination at work. 
Not only does this “rule” evince the fit of the work, as I said above; this “rule,” to which the work 
singularly attests, is also communicable only through the play of the work’s constitutive 
elements. In the end, only this play is communicable. Hence Ricœur explains that, in Kantian 
terms, only through its incarnation in a work is the play between imagination and understanding 
communicable through a singular relation that is in principle available to everyone.45 This play 
between imagination and understanding, which is incarnated in an individual work, manifests 
the fit that the listener, reader, or spectator grasps in apprehending the work. The fit of the work 
therefore marks the conjuncture between its expression-exemplification of the “rule” that it 
summons and its augmentation of the listener, reader, or spectator’s world.  
In the passage cited above, in which Ricœur remarks on how the work iconically 
augments the artist’s lived experience, he stresses that only this iconic augmentation—“as 
augmentation”—is communicable. The artist’s audacity in discovering or inventing the solution 
to the problem or question for which the work constitutes the answer finds fulfillment in the 
listener, reader, or spectator’s adventure. The connection between the listener, reader, or 
spectator’s grasp of the fit of the work and the composer, author, or artist’s “fitting production” 
far from justifies the fallacy of seeking the meaning of a work in its creator’s intention. Rather, the 
singular feeling of the work’s unique suitability accompanies the listener’s apprehension of the 
“idea” that the work as a whole expresses. The air of rightness emanating from the work bears 
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out the communicability of an experience that augments the listener’s affective field and that the 
work itself exemplifies. Through instantiating its “rule,” the play initiated and structured by the 
work thus also sets the imagination to work.  
The importance that Ricœur places on “Kant’s concept of productive imagination as 
schematizing a synthetic operation”46 underscores reflective judgment’s operative role. In the 
same way that the plot of a story “functions as the narrative matrix,”47 the icon in the case of 
metaphor is the “schematization of metaphorical attribution.”48 In short, the icon is the matrix of 
the new predicative pertinence that resolves the initial semantic clash by producing the image 
depicted through this predicative assimilation. The “enigma of iconic presentation,”49 Ricœur 
explains, lies in the way that the predicative assimilation is depicted within the metaphorical 
operation. Each time, the meaning intended can be grasped only by drawing it from the ruins of 
the initial semantic impertinence. The matrix of metaphorical attribution displays the intended 
image only in the thickness of the imagining scene. Hence the enigma is resolved “each time the 
new intended meaning is grasped as what the icon describes or depicts.”50 
Does the work’s exemplarity open a new path for thinking about truth? Just as the matrix 
of the new semantic pertinence resolves the enigma of iconic presentation, the work’s 
exemplification of its singular character augments the field of our experiences. Hans-Georg 
Gadamer once remarked that imagination is most richly productive in a “field of play where the 
understanding’s desire for unity does not so much confine it as suggest incitements to play.”51 
Through summoning the “rule” to which it alone attests, the work renews the real in accordance 
with the world that it unfolds. Hence for Ricœur, if “one can speak of truth in relation to the 
work of art, it is to the extent that this designates the capacity of the work of art to break a path in 
the real”52 by refiguring it.    
Why, Ricœur then asks, “should we not say that the univocity of truth is . . . exploded by 
mimesis—to the point that it indicates this fitness, this appropriateness”53 exuded by the 
fittingness of certain works and instances of language? It is, he ventures, because the concept of 
truth as adequation—the “accomplice of the representative illusion” 54—blocks the way. It is not 
even certain, Ricœur writes, that “Heidegger’s substitution of truth as manifestation for truth as 
adequation responds to what mimesis demands of our thinking about truth.” 55 For the truth that 
a work reveals is one that it not only discovers but also invents.   
  Attributing the truth of the work to its power for discovering dimensions of experience 
that have no prior referents in reality ultimately underscores the difference between the work’s 
exemplarity and the classical conception of truth.  For, where the truth of the work concerns the 
capacity for refiguring reality in the light of the worlds that individual works unfold, the power 
that works have to refashion our expectations runs ahead of the principle of adequation that 
governs this classical conception.56 The work’s exemplarity therefore stands as the solution to the 
paradox of aesthetic experience’s singularity and universality, which Ricœur maintains must be 
followed to its end.57  This universality springs from the way that the experience communicated 
by a work is in principle open to everyone. Correlatively, the communicability of this singular 
experience vests the work’s exemplarity—which is the ground of its truth—with its prospective 
dimension. A work’s power to shatter the world of our everyday experiences and to remake it 
from within is therefore not only concentrated in the work’s exemplification of different ways of 
thinking, feeling, and acting; the fit of the work also makes a claim upon us in demanding a 
response. This claim lies at the heart of the truth of the work. The claim that a work makes opens 
us to the world anew. Hence this claim is also a wager. 
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The idea that the truth of the work designates the capacity to break open congealed ways 
of thinking, feeling, and acting underscores the conjuncture between the work’s exemplification 
of a way of inhabiting the world and the prospective dimension of the claim it makes. By 
inventing or discovering new modalities of thought, feeling, and action, individual works 
disquiet habituated orientations and understandings. The “rule” that the work summons here 
acquires its true force and ontological vehemence. For through exemplifying this “rule,” each 
work attests that the solution it provides is the fitting response to the question, problem, or crisis 
for which it is the answer. 
The force of the claim that a work makes inheres in this capacity for breaking open the 
world of our everyday experiences. The air of rightness exuded by a work conveys this force. 
Gadamer points out that a claim is the ground for the fulfillment of a demand.58 As such, the 
demand exerts its effect only as an unfulfilled claim. The commitment proper to the work’s 
ontological vehemence here bears out the anticipatory structure of the truth of the work. For just 
as a claim that exists against someone demands its enforcement, the apprehension of a work as a 
“fitting production” enjoins the listener, reader, or spectator to make her own the work’s 
exemplary expression of a world that the work alone reveals. 
The way that mimesis explodes the univocity of the classical concept of truth illuminates 
the connection between the work’s exemplarity and its worlding power. For where it is a 
question of the work’s refiguration of reality by transcending the real from within, no adequation 
within the existing order is sufficient. The transcendence of reality within the world configured 
by a work is the spring of the work’s prospective claim. Reality, Gadamer remarks, “always 
stands in a horizon of desired or feared or, at any rate, still undecided future possibilities.”59 
Nowhere is the power of imagination more apparent than in the way that individual works 
reanimate our horizons. For through giving voice to alternatives that they project, such works 
also play a part in forming our hopes, fears, and expectations.    
The way that individual works proffer ways of inhabiting the world through disrupting 
accepted conventions and expectations is akin to the way that exemplary moral and political acts 
transform the ordinary course of everyday events. Might the work of art, Ricœur in fact asks, 
“with its conjunction of singularity and communicability, . . . [be] a model for thinking the notion 
of testimony”?60 If one is serious about aesthetic experience’s transposition into the domains of 
ethics and politics, he explains, “one would have to take into account the two main aspects of the 
work: its singularity and its communicability, with the particular form of universality that the 
latter implies.”61 For just as the truth of the work rests on the singular work’s power to proffer a 
world that is open to all, “in the realm of extreme moral choices, we find [an analogous relation 
of] exemplarity and communicability” 62 in acts that initiate new courses of action.  
This transposition of aesthetic experience into lateral domains further accentuates the 
place that a work’s exemplarity has with respect to the demand that mimesis makes on the way 
that we think about truth. When it comes to a “fitting production,” mimesis, Ricœur insists, “is 
ahead of our concept of reference, the real, and truth.”63 Breaking with the concept of truth as 
adequation not only liberates mimesis from the representative illusion; highlighting the 
conjunction of the work’s singularity and communicability also emphasizes the temporal 
character of the claim that each work makes. The conjunction of the work’s singularity and 
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communicability highlights the paradox of this claim’s universality. This claim seeks its 
normativity in the invitation that issues from the work (or, in the moral and political realms, in 
the injunction that issues from an exemplary act). For each time a listener, reader, or spectator 
grasps the fit of the work as a model for a new way of inhabiting the world, the claim that the 
work makes refashions the world in accordance with its own rejoinder to the question, problem, 
or crisis for which it is the answer. 
The communicability of the “acts that we admire ethically”64 has its counterpart in the 
work’s power to augment the field of our experiences. The testimony proffered by individual acts 
of sacrifice, commitment, and devotion is the analogue, in the realm of difficult moral choices, to 
the truth of a musical work, literary text, or a work of art. Like a work, exemplary acts also carry 
the force of those convictions enjoined by the “rule” that each summons. Acts that meet the 
demand of the political or moral crisis to which each is the singularly fitting response thus give a 
face to courage and hope through the testimony offered by exemplary lives: Aung San Suu Kyi, 
Nelson Mandela, the Dalai Lama, Mother Theresa. 
Moral and political acts that we admire commend themselves to us by reason of their 
fittingness. The injunction to “follow after” the act springs from our convictions regarding its 
suitability to the situation; the act speaks to us by means of our apprehension of this fit. Its 
exemplarity is therefore a source for our convictions regarding our own moral and political 
conduct. The effect of being drawn to follow the example set by the act, Ricœur comments, is 
“really the equivalent of the communicability of the work of art.”65 German, he adds, has a word 
that French does not to “express this capacity for following after, this exemplarity: Nachfolge.”66 
For, through taking initiatives based on examples that we admire, we make those examples our 
own in new situations in which we find ourselves, and which again call for imagination in the 
exercise of good judgment. 
This exercise of judgment constitutes one of the principal features of the hermeneutics of 
testimony. Judgment in fact figures both in Ricœur’s semantic analysis of the term, and in his 
treatment of the philosophical problem of testimony as “testimony of the absolute.”67 The term 
testimony, Ricœur explains, “should be applied to words, works, actions, and to lives which 
attest to an intention, an inspiration, an idea at the heart of experience and history which 
nonetheless transcend experience and history.”68 For him, the irruption of the term’s religious 
meaning thus opens up an absolutely new dimension within the semantic complex of testimony’s 
profane senses. 
The irruption of this religious meaning seems at first to refute any connection between 
the work of art’s exemplarity and the testimony proffered by exemplary acts.  According to 
Ricœur, the new dimension opened up conserves the meanings that inhere in the initial semantic 
complex. At the same time, the quasi-empirical meaning of the act of testifying receives a new 
significance in a theology of testimony that preserves a “certain narrative kernel . . . in strict 
union with the confession of faith.”69 Similarly, the situation of the trial, in which testimony is 
given and weighed, acquires a new dimension within the context of the great trial in which the 
“kingdom and its justice is the stake of an immense contest between God and the Prince of the 
world.”70 The relation between the witness and his act also acquires a new significance with the 
irruption of the prophetic and kerygmatic dimension. Here, as in the profane order, the “disciple 
is martyr because he is a witness, not the inverse.”71 When in a limit situation where the “test of 
conviction becomes the price of a life,”72 the sacrificial act itself constitutes the “testimony of 
conscience” in its devotion to a cause. Within the context of this biblical exegesis, the faithful 
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witness is the one whose life and death manifest the light according to which the world is to be 
judged. 
This hermeneutics of testimony is tantamount to a project of liberation under the name of 
the absolute. The originary affirmation that Ricœur opposes to the claim to absolute knowledge 
opens the way to the reciprocal relation between the “promotion of consciousness and the 
recognition of the absolute in its signs.”73 Here, testimony is the “expression of the freedom that 
we desire to be.”74 For Ricœur, a hermeneutics of testimony and a criteriology of the divine, 
following Jean Nabert, are as inseparable as are exteriority and height. (Exteriority and height, 
Ricœur explains, are also inseparable to the extent that one’s conscience cannot bring about the 
divestment of one’s ego “without the testimony of certain acts, certain lives, that, despite their 
radical contingency, their plain historicity, speak in the name of the absolute.”75) Just as Nabert 
observes that “the painter makes everything a testimony that awaits a witness,”76 the testimony 
rendered by such acts and lives gives something to be interpreted. Each time, the crisis provoked 
by the testimony of exemplary acts and lives calls for a judgment and a decision as a witness to 
these signs of freedom’s actualization. 
This singular relation between the act and the call to conscience that issues from it lends 
support to the idea that the work of art might be a model for thinking about testimony. At the 
same time, the testimony given by the act that transcends its historically contingent conditions 
has a counterpart in the claim that a work makes. The work’s vehemence, I argued above, springs 
from the work’s redescription of reality in the light of the world that the work itself unfolds.  The 
“passion for the possible,”77 to which the hermeneutics of testimony itself attests, is also 
operative in the claims that works make. This passion is hope’s answer to all amor fati. And yet, 
the claims that works make, and the injunction that issues from the testimony offered by 
exemplary lives, belong to different regions. For the latter, there is “no other testimony rendered 
to height, to the glory of the infinite, than the testimony of exteriority, of the assignment of 
responsibility”78 through the call to conscience. For the former, the world that the work expresses 
marks the irruption of an alternative without injunction or constraint. Only an aesthetic 
gnosticim could confuse the hermeneutics of testimony’s assumption of responsibility with 
works’ fictive explorations. And yet, to the extent that these imaginative explorations refigure the 
practical field, they also play a part in the world’s transformation.  
The prospective dimension of the claim or injunction that issues from an individual work 
or act underscores the connection between the work or act’s exemplarity and hope’s practical and 
existential necessity.79 In citing the example of St. Francis Assisi, Ricœur emphasizes that the 
order, which St. Francis addresses to his followers, passes by way of the injunction of one single 
individual that inspires another. Here, Ricœur points out, we are again in the sphere of reflective 
judgment, where “communicability does not lie in applying a rule to a case but in the fact that it 
is the case that summons its rule; and it calls for the latter, precisely, in rendering itself 
communicable.”80 Here the individual case engenders its normativity by reason of its 
exemplarity. By summoning the “rule” to which it alone attests, the singular act seeks its 
normativity in the claim to universality that stems from the injunction issuing from the act. 
 I cannot stress enough the connection between Ricœur’s definition of mimesis as 
refiguration and the capacity of individual acts to fight against the narrowing of the field of our 
experiences. At the same time, the difference between the prophetic character of manifestations 
that testify to the absolute and the prospective dimension of works that break open congealed 
horizons serves as a caution against the spiritual gnosticism that plagued romantic aesthetics.  
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Like the exemplary act, the work of art commends itself to us by virtue of our grasp of its 
fittingness vis-à-vis the demands of the situation but without injunction or constraint. For 
Ricœur, giving the singular expression of this fit the “best chance of the greatest universality”81 
would mean following the requirements of the work’s singularity and communicability to its 
end. Whereas Hannah Arendt highlights the “retrospective view of the spectator over the 
prospective view of the actors of history”82 in reflective judgment, Ricœur stresses the connection 
between the exemplarity of fitting acts and the handholds they provide for hope. For him, the 
“acknowledged exemplarity of works of art, like that of great events, would not constitute a 
pledge of hope if exemplarity did not serve as . . . a proof, for hope.”83 Attending to “the work of 
an imagination invited to ‘think more’”84 thus turns the regard for exemplary acts and works 
toward future expectations.  
Conclusion 
As a model for thinking about testimony, the work of art’s capacity for discovering 
modalities of experience beyond our everyday ways of engaging with the world bears out the 
power of imagination. Through exploding the univocity of the classical conception of truth, this 
capacity not only distinguishes the truth of art from that of adequation; transposed laterally onto 
the ethical and political planes, this capacity also has its analog in the power to initiate a new 
course of action in the midst of history. In the same way that mimesis demands more of our 
thinking about truth, the testimony of exemplary lives requires that we acknowledge the 
communicability of singular acts. If, as Ricœur suggests, “we lack a sufficiently multivocal 
concept of truth . . . that would fuse, at its margins, with the concept of rightness,”85 perhaps it is 
because we fail to grasp how, as “fitting productions,” individual works and acts seek their 
normativity by way of the invitation or injunction that is extended to all. Adorno’s refusal to 
accept the risk that this entails relegated music and art’s truth to a hibernatory refuge. 
Conversely, the exemplification by a work or an act of the response demanded by the situation 
provides a practical handhold for the wager we make through following after. 
The solution to the paradox of the work’s singularity and communicability leads again to 
the idea that the capacity for forging new paths is a function of the powers of thought, 
imagination, and good judgment in situation. The conjunction of the work’s singularity and 
communicability in aesthetic experience is a model for the search for normativity that issues from 
exemplary works and acts. For through summoning its “rule,” a work sets the play of 
imagination and understanding to work. Only this play, as it is incarnated in the work, is 
communicable. Hence only this play can be shared. Gadamer reminds us that, through giving 
rise to thought, this free play of imagination and understanding lets us “look out beyond 
everything that is given in experience.”86 This “looking out beyond” gives the search for 
normativity its anticipatory structure. Consequently, the “rule” that the work summons binds 
this search to the apprehension of the fit that the work exemplifies, which in principle is open to 
everyone. 
The transposition of aesthetic experience into other domains, however, does not 
eliminate the difference between aesthetic experience and the exercise of moral and political 
judgment on the practical plane. On the contrary, failing to differentiate between the force of the 
claim that emanates from the work’s air of rightness and the authority of the injunction that 
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issues from an exemplary moral or political act risks moralizing the one and aestheticizing the 
other.  
This caution is directed as much against a deconstructive fascination with the 
representative illusion as it is aimed at giving music and art’s power to break open new ways of 
thinking, feeling, and acting its due. Through opening the world to us and us to the world anew, 
works bear out their ontological vehemence. This vehemence justifies the confidence that groups 
and communities have in cultural works that attest to the communities’ desire, will, and effort to 
exist. This confidence in turn plays a critical role in the quest for identity and the struggle for 
recognition. The claims that cultural works make, I would even suggest, here join themselves to a 
sense of obligation to honor the debt to others and to the past. At the threshold of this inquiry, 
the notion that the work is a model for thinking about testimony warrants a fuller engagement 
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